

00319

1974/11/15

USC 552 (b) (3)

PER CIA

~~SECRET~~


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS  
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (U)

SRD-SR-04-75

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



PREPARED BY  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
SPECIAL RESEARCH DETACHMENT  
FORT BRADY, MAZ AND

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY DDI USAINSCOM F01:PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

C74075

COPY NO.

23 (1)

~~SECRET~~

USC 552 (b) (3)  
PER CIA

This document was produced by the US Army Special Research Detachment (SRD). Other than normal exchange with other agencies at the working level, this paper has not been coordinated outside SRD. Interpretation of intelligence information in this publication represents the views of SRD and may be subject to modification in the light of subsequent new information.

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 793, 794, and 798. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

2  
~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
U.S. ARMY SPECIAL RESEARCH DETACHMENT  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS  
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (U)

SPR-CP-64-75

15 NOVEMBER 1974

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON ~~SEP~~ 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1 603 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
Introduction . . . . .	1
Background . . . . .	1
Summary of Conclusions . . . . .	2
Early Military Aid to the Chinese Communists . . . . .	2
Initial Chinese Programs, 1950-1960 . . . . .	3
Significant . . . . . by Type . . . . .	3
- Fraternal States . . . . .	4
- Tanzania, A Model for the LDC's . . . . .	4
- Pakistan — Security before Ideology . . . . .	8
- Guerrillas, Open and Covert . . . . .	11
Factors in Assessing Impact of Chinese Military Aid . . . . .	13
Conclusions . . . . .	14
Distribution . . . . .	16

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#### Introduction

(U) This study was produced by the United States Army Special Research Detachment, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, in compliance with OACSI tasking Memorandum, PRC Military Assistance Programs, dated 22 March 1974.

(U) The purpose of this study is to provide a current assessment of People's Republic of China military assistance programs\* to foreign countries, with special attention given the probable future course of the Chinese military aid effort. It is a compilation of both raw and finished intelligence at the SECRET level, and the information is current as of 1 August 1974.

#### Background

(U) The military assistance program of the People's Republic of China has attracted considerable attention from its beginning, particularly as it branched into the Lesser Developed Countries (LDC). Observers were not only concerned with the implications of a Chinese advance into the Third World, just at the point when the PRC was espousing world revolution, but were equally curious about the capability to mount major arms export programs of a China supposedly debilitated by the Great Leap forward and cutoff of Soviet technical aid.

(U) The Chinese did manage to mount an extensive arms aid effort to the lesser developed countries. Memories of Korea haunted some, who predicted Chinese power-grabs in Southeast Asia or Africa, preceded or followed by armies of "volunteers."

(U) The Chinese Communist foreign military assistance effort is of interest not only for itself and the implications for recipients, but also for any insights into the PRC's military capabilities and intentions. This study is a current assessment of the military aid programs of China, with emphasis given to the programs involving the LDC's, for it is in these nations that the type and amount of military aid which China is capable of providing has the greatest importance.

\*In this study, military assistance will be taken to include combat troops or other direct support personnel, weapons and equipment, training in China and in the local area, and the establishment of indigenous arms industries or military facilities.

1

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-003 DOD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

Summary of Conclusions

(U) (S) Analysis of the current scope and impact of the PRC military assistance program leads to the following judgments and conclusions:

- a. The Chinese military assistance program for the less developed nations of the world has lost its earlier momentum and has entered a phase of reduction and rationalization.
- b. China's increasingly outdated military technology no longer attracts arms clients; any advances in military equipment made by the PRC will necessarily be channeled first to domestic requirements.
- c. Although new, genuinely sizable arms agreements are improbable, the PRC likely will continue to maintain previous arms delivery commitments and will provide spares and maintenance for already delivered equipment.

- d. A fresh approach to assessing PRC military assistance programs is warranted, and should focus on:

- Impact of the programs, rather than dollar value or geographic diversity.
- The analytical use of materiel depreciation standards to make older data more reflective of current reality.

Early Military Aid to the Chinese Communists

(U) Corresponding to the rise of the Chinese Communists to power was the development of a pattern of foreign military assistance, almost exclusively of Soviet origin. As the current PRC leadership perceives its early history, the Communists were forced to compete with the Nationalists for arms and Russian advisors, due to the vagaries of Stalin's China policy. Even after the bloody Kuomintang-Communist rupture, Soviet aid to the Chinese Reds was close-fisted and undependable. The Chinese developed a reliance on their own small-scale manufactures and captured Nationalist weapons. Military supply matters improved somewhat in the wake of the nominal Nationalist-Communist reconciliation in the late 1930's, when both camps pledged unity in the anti-Japanese struggle. Following the entrance of the United States into the Pacific War, the Communists received a small amount of American equipment and a number of American advisors; however, this did not begin to match the massive aid and advisory effort provided to the Nationalist forces. Soviet assistance likewise reached the KMT armies in much greater amounts than the Red armies.

(U) The Soviet occupation of Manchuria in 1945 furnished the Russians with an enormous stockpile of Japanese military equipment and an extensive armaments industry. They turned over much of the former to Communist forces and hauled most of the latter to the USSR as booty. The Chinese Communists themselves captured large amounts of Japanese arms. As the Chinese Civil War grew in scope and intensity, the Communists captured much of the American equipment which had been furnished to the Nationalists, including naval vessels and aircraft.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

(U) By 1949 and the establishment of the People's Republic, the Chinese armed forces were well-equipped and able to subdue internal threats and give pause to any potential invaders. Mao was justified in believing that his victory had been achieved almost in spite of Soviet neglect. This experience has influenced Chinese strategic thought and arms aid policies: revolutionaries must always place the greatest emphasis on self-reliance in military matters; the battlefield should be their main source of weapons.

#### Initial Chinese Programs, 1950-1960

(U) (S) The earliest military assistance rendered by the People's Republic of China was, of course, the heavy commitment of men and materiel to the Korean War. To a certain extent, the country's effort was more a Soviet-supplied and directed program; however, the loss of hundreds of thousands of Chinese casualties, including combat-experienced or technically valuable personnel, was a dear price paid by the Peking regime. Aid to North Korea continued after the armistice, the materiel side taking on a more Chinese appearance in the later 1950's.

(U) (S) In the Viet Minh war with the French, as in Korea, the Chinese showed an absolute determination to influence events, not only from ideological predilections, but also from concern over affairs in neighboring countries. Chinese-made war materiel flowed steadily into Indochina after 1950, and Chinese military advisers entered the Communist-controlled areas of Indochina. The anticolonial at Dien Bien Phu was assured by Chinese artillery and training.

(U) (S) In the later 1950's, the growing internationalization of Chinese interests, particularly their loudly-proclaimed revolutionary zeal, led Peking to offer military assistance outside the Communist bloc. Chinese weapons turned up in several Southeast Asian insurgencies. The PRC made a public offer of armed "volunteers" for Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis; Nasser quickly replied with "thanks-but-no-thanks." The first sizable assistance was provided to the Algerian rebels seeking to drive the French from Algeria. In September 1958, the PRC recognized the Algerian Provisional Government, and a considerable amount of Chinese arms was subsequently funneled to the rebels through Morocco.

(U) (S) While the Chinese were committing a significant portion of their arms production and military expertise to the support of fellow Communists and amenable insurgents, Soviet machinery and technical aid was establishing an arms industry in China capable of satisfying almost every defense requirement, save one. This became a major cause of the Sino-Soviet rift, for the Russians refused to provide the PRC with nuclear weapons.

(U) (S) The abrupt departure of Soviet technicians in 1960 and the subsequent reduction of Soviet military assistance to China to non-offensive materiel brought the Chinese face-to-face with the necessity of providing for not only their own defense needs, but also the needs of whatever clients their foreign policy enlisted.

#### Significant Efforts, by Type

(U) (S) The Chinese military assistance program is too small and limited for a country-by-country survey to be informative. The most effective method for analyzing the Chinese effort in its different forms and varying degrees

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM



7

~~SECRET~~

of success is to categorize it by major types representing specific Chinese approaches to groups of nations or political movements. The Fraternal States type concerns aid to North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, and Romania; the Tanzania type concerns not only that nation, but other newly-independent and unstable countries; Pakistan is a type by itself, the largest recipient, requiring arms alone, while the Guerrilla type (both open and covert) includes both internationally-recognized liberation movements and insurgencies against nations which maintain diplomatic relations with the PRC.

#### Fraternal States

(U) (S) (M) China has served as a regular supplier of military equipment to North Korea; however, the Soviet Union remains the major source of advanced equipment, such as MIG-21's. There may be a formal, though secret, arrangement between the North Koreans and China, whereby the increasingly significant North Korean military aid to certain LDC's has Chinese approval and the cost of the assistance may be reimbursed through Chinese shipments to North Korea of such items as MIG-19's.

(U) (S) (M) (D) The North Vietnamese have depended heavily on Chinese military aid, to include a sizable presence of engineers and other specialized troops. The limitations of the Chinese were evident, however, from the beginnings of the bombings of North Vietnam, when Soviet SAM's and advanced electronics were essential to the North's air defense complex. The Chinese repeatedly harassed and even pillaged Soviet military goods moving through China to North Vietnam; Soviet requests for permission to establish air transport corridors were denied; and the turmoil and disorganization associated with the Cultural Revolution impeded the orderly transport of Soviet goods by rail. Notwithstanding these limitations, North Vietnam remains very much dependent on Chinese military equipment and the safe base area southern China represents during wartime.

(U) (S) (M) China and Albania have formed an alliance of mutual benefit, with the Chinese furnishing virtually all of Albania's military needs in return for ideological support in the Sino-Soviet dispute. This unique relationship, which began in the early 1960's, poses no special threat to Soviet interests and probably will continue its curious existence. Reportedly, two or three Chinese-designed SHANGHAI-class patrol boats were displayed at a Romanian naval celebration in August 1973; they were believed basically to have been of Romanian construction. Romania, however, has an extensive arms industry of its own and probably would not desire the type of materiel China can supply, with the possible exception of the blueprints for the well-regarded patrol boat.

#### Tanzania: A Model for the LDC's

(U) (S) (M) (D) The Chinese military assistance program in Tanzania has long been considered the stereotype penetration of a lesser developed country. There are more Chinese military advisors in that country than in any other LDC, PRC military aid expenditures there have been the highest for any African nation and second only to those in Pakistan, and Chinese-Tanzanian relations seemed more even and friendly than in other LDC's. The Tanzanian situation has been illustrative of the PRC's problems as well as its successes; a distinct and growing disenchantment with Chinese arms and aid policies has set in, echoing China's experiences in other LDC's.

RE GRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5:

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

(U) (S) (R) (D) China's precise reasons in selecting Tanzania for a major arms aid effort are unknown; however, several obvious ones can be suggested. Tanzania's geographic position is excellent for any possible plans the PRC may have or has had for political influence over the black African states. In the context of the early 1960's, when China was engaged in barely-concealed military aid to Congolese rebels, Tanganyika--as the country was known before its merger with Zanzibar in April 1964--offered access to the rebellious areas of Congo as well as to other politically restive nations. In addition, President Nyerere's soaring political ambitions had been humiliatingly shattered when he was forced to call in UK troops to subdue a January 1964 army mutiny; he could not have been in a more receptive mood to Chinese overtures. Other purposes for the Chinese effort have been suggested, such as the possible location of PRC satellite tracking facilities in Tanzania, or even the basing of Chinese naval vessels at this strategic position on the Indian Ocean. As the military assistance program roughly coincided with the initiation of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad (Tan-Zam RR) project, it is possible that the 700-odd PRC military personnel in the country have a contingency mission of protecting some 15,000 Chinese working on the railroad and in other economic schemes. The Chinese have had bitter experiences in Southeast Asia at the hands of suddenly-hostile peoples and have shown a willingness to fight back.

(U) (S) (R) (D) The most publicized possible reason for the heavy Chinese presence in Tanzania is that the PRC has sought to make the nation into a showpiece of Chinese capabilities in the LDC's, with appropriate propaganda exploitation in the running ideological dispute with the Soviet Union.

(U) (S) (R) (D) One of the first Chinese arms deliveries to Tanzania resulted from an early 1964 grant of small arms worth \$500,000. Other agreements followed, undoubtedly complementing the Chinese willingness to construct the Tan-Zam RR. Western experts had dismissed the project as economically unsound; an approach to the Soviet Union for support was unsuccessful. The PRC was approached about July 1964 and approved the project in early 1965. A full Tanzanian-Zambian-PRC agreement was signed 5 September 1967.

(U) (S) (R) (D) The Chinese assistance program in Tanzania was thorough and deliberate. A June 1964 agreement called for equipment for 3,000 troops; a March 1965 equipment agreement was for 20,000 troops; a June 1966 agreement expanded the aid to include a naval base and naval craft. By 1969, the PRC had become virtually the sole supplier of arms to Tanzania, and an ammunition plant had been established; in February 1970, construction of an airbase and provision of aircraft and radar was agreed upon; pilot training in China began in January 1971, followed by the training of ground support personnel. A November 1970 protocol covered grant aid of weapons and ground equipment for 35,000 men. A 1971 agreement dealt with construction of a military academy, and 1972 and 1973 agreements covered AAA guns and other equipment. The foregoing agreements included Chinese military technicians in Tanzania and training of Tanzanians in China, as appropriate.

(U) (S) (R) (D) By 1972, the Chinese began to balk at the incessant requests for more and better arms. They complained that, although it had been agreed as many as 11,000 rifles were to be forwarded to liberation movements, many weapons had been passed out without accountability. An April 1972 request for 75,000 arms for the militia was rejected--the Chinese said they would only honor prior commitments for an additional 20,000 rifles, AAA guns, and

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

two naval craft. An estimated \$0,000 small arms had been delivered to Tanzania between 1964 and 1973; some were given to guerrilla groups, others to Biafran insurgents and the Tanzanian police. The Tanzanians persisted, with little success. In February 1973, Chou En-lai told a Tanzanian delegation that China's productive capacity was limited and that the PRC had to worry about the USSR, India, and the US. Chou suggested that the Tanzanians get along better with Zaire and Uganda, so as to reduce regional arms rivalries. Chinese advisors reflected this new, hard look at the military aid program. They told the Tanzanians to spend more attention on building a socialist Army and less on officer comforts and to control arms distribution more tightly.

(U)(S/AFD) Although they regularly lectured the Tanzanians on better utilization of the military equipment already on hand, the Chinese continued arms shipments. The promised 17 MIG-19's and 3 MIG-17's were delivered at the end of 1973; Chinese pilots aided in flight testing, and most if not all of the aircraft are now operational. A main airbase at Ngerengera and five operational bases to cover all the country's borders were constructed with Chinese technical assistance.

(U)(S/AFD) The Tanzanians again pressed for arms in July 1974, this time calling attention to the bellicose statements of Uganda's leader Idi Amin. The Chinese Embassy was not as negative as on previous occasions, and the request was forwarded to Peking for decision.

(U)(S/AFD) Chinese reluctance has had its effect, and Tanzanian delegations have traveled to Moscow and other places, seeking the arms refusal by the PRC. In 1973, arms agreements were concluded with Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea; the latter deal may have been arranged with the assistance of the Chinese. It is probable that further advances in weaponry by Tanzania's neighbors will be followed by additional arms agreements with other nations — the PRC seems to have tired of the effort in Tanzania.

(U)(S/AFD) The Chinese military aid programs and experiences in the other African LDC's have not been as extensive or as vexing as those in Tanzania; however, China's political image suffered serious damage in the 1960's due to a seemingly irrational policy of subversion and meddling in many of the African countries. Chinese diplomatic missions in several instances were accused of direct subversion of the host government and were ousted in the most flagrant cases.

(U)(S/AFD) In the early 1960's, Africa would seem to have been the surest area for the PRC to have made good and fast friends. The many newly-independent states shared common pasts and presents with each other and, in some instances, shared certain attitudes with the Chinese: they felt a non-white, anti-colonialist kinship with the Chinese; they were led by charismatic leaders disposed towards authoritarianism; they espoused state-controlled economies; and they scorned anti-Communism as simply an Imperialist weapon. The PRC had championed many of the independence leaders who were now in power, and leaders of such stature as Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi made several trips to Africa between 1963 and 1965.

(U)(S/AFD) The early Chinese efforts on the continent included the delivery of arms to the Algerian rebels in the late 1950's. In 1960, Vice Premier Cirianga of the rebattled Congo government of Lumumba asked China for volunteers.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/P0  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

helicopters, and munitions. The PRC responded with a large financial grant, but declined to send volunteers, "for reasons of geography." After the downfall of Lumumba and the intervention of the United Nations, China supported rebels opposing the Leopoldville government, and by 1964, considerable military equipment was reaching the rebels through Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi—the PRC had diplomatic missions in both of these countries.

(U) (S/P) Despite their diplomatic successes in the Third World, the Chinese behaved strangely from the mid-1960's, even before the fanaticism of the Cultural Revolution; perhaps it was the pressure of the developing Sino-Soviet dispute which drove the Chinese representatives in the LDC's to attempt to undermine the very governments which had befriended the PRC. The meddling in the Congo problem might have been explainable from the standpoint of opposing Big Power intervention; however, the subsequent petty efforts to subvert other African states still defy complete understanding.

(U) (S/P) A semisecret guerrilla training camp, staffed by at least 17 Chinese military personnel, was established in 1964 in Ghana and operated until the downfall of Nkrumah in 1966. Trainees at the camp represented not only colonial territories, but, revealingly, citizens of Cameroon, Gabon, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Upper Volta, and Zambia.

(U) (S/P) Rwanda charged that tribal exiles, trained by Chinese personnel in Burundi, attacked its territory in 1963 and 1964. Niger alleged that a 1964 attack by the opposition party had been led by Chinese and financed with PRC funds. In 1965, Malawi charged that PRC-funded dissidents based in Tanzania were plotting an invasion. Complications arose as the Chinese expanded their activities; Jomo Kenyatta suspected that the Chinese were supporting shifite (Somali separatists) raids into Kenya.

(U) (S/P) In 1965, Burundi, suspecting that the PRC Embassy had been involved in a coup plot, suspended diplomatic relations and ordered the mission members to leave the country. This disrupted Chinese contacts with the Congolese rebels and the persistent Rwandan plotters. Trouble continued to dog the Chinese. In January 1966, both the Central African Republic and Dahomey broke diplomatic relations with the PRC over suspected military aid to subversive factions. The ouster of Ghana's Nkrumah in February 1966 and subsequent revelations of Chinese clandestine activities led to pressure from the new regime, culminating in the departure of the Chinese mission in November. The Ghanaians charged that the Chinese had been providing military support for a comeback attempt by Nkrumah. In the same year, Kenya protested to China, the USSR, and other countries that Kenyan citizens were being given military training without the permission of the government. Chinese diplomats were ousted as a result of charges that they were involved in efforts to bring down Kenyatta.

(U) (S/P) The plotting went on. In 1967, the PRC was accused of providing military training in China and uniforms to members of the Eritrean Liberation Front and of giving varying amounts of military support to insurgents from the Central African Republic, Chad, French Somaliland (TFAL), and the Comore Islands. Chinese military instructors based in Congo (Brazzaville) provided training to Cameroon oppositionists. In 1968, the PRC was suspected of supporting Senegalese dissidents and of involvement in a plot to assassinate President Tubman of Liberia. A press report claimed that a Chinese "military

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON  
SEP 10 1997  
BY OPR USAINSCOM F01/MO  
AUTH Para 1 603 DOD 520.1R

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

expert" had visited the breakaway nation of Biafra and had offered training and arms. The Biafran leader, Colonel Ojukwu, had in fact sent a letter to Mao Tse-tung, requesting aid. Chinese-made weapons did reach the Biafran forces, but they may have been supplied from Tanzanian stockpiles.

(U) (S) (FOUO) The capability and willingness of the Chinese to meddle in African internal affairs seemed unaffected by rising distrust in the affected countries; only the ferore of the Cultural Revolution brought this period of subversion to an end by bringing many diplomats back to Peking and leaving their overseas posts in states of suspension. When the Chinese resumed normal operations in Africa, they were less abusive of their hosts and concentrated military assistance in the training and equipping of legal governments and anticolonial liberation movements. By 1971, Zhou En-lai had promised to stop military support of the Eritrean and Zairian dissidents.

#### Pakistan: Security before Ideology

(U) (S) (FOUO) The Chinese experience in Pakistan is important, for it not only represents the greatest effort so far undertaken by China in furnishing military assistance to a lesser developed country, but also illustrates the limits of Chinese capabilities.

(U) (S) (FOUO) The initial Chinese arms aid to Pakistan resulted from a complex set of South Asian events, primarily a falling-out between the United States and Pakistan. In 1954, Pakistan signed a military assistance agreement with the United States and joined SEATO. From 1954 to 1965, the Pakistan armed forces were completely modernized with American equipment, 95 percent of which was grant-aid under the Military Assistance Program. The Indians moved to strengthen their own forces and diversify their sources of supply by negotiating the delivery of Soviet helicopters and transport aircraft in 1960.

(U) (S) (FOUO) Nehru adopted a forward policy on the disputed Sino-Indian frontier in 1962, bolstered perhaps by a major agreement with the Soviets for the establishment of MIG-21 production facilities in India; cost was estimated at up to \$170 million. China pre-empted Indian threats to oust the Chinese from disputed border areas through a sudden, massive attack on the Indians in October 1962. The Indian forces were routed, and the US airlifted urgently-needed military supplies into India. Soviet-Indian military aid agreements multiplied, with a major pact in 1964 calling for delivery of 225 T-55 and 176 PT-76 tanks, 38 MIG 21's, and other weaponry. Soviet advisors were stationed in India, and Indians went to the USSR for military training. SA-2 missile sites were established.

(U) (S) (FOUO) The Pakistanis were alarmed over the advanced arms being delivered by the Soviets to the Indians and sought to diversify their materiel sources. In March 1965, President Ayub Khan traveled to Peking to open negotiations for the delivery of Chinese munitions. The discussions dragged on through the summer. In September 1965, Pakistani provocations in Kashmir led to a brief war. The Indians seized the initiative and inflicted a relatively greater loss on the Pakistanis. The US and UK embargoed arms deliveries to the warring nations. The Chinese immediately filled the breach by offering a large grant of military aid, including an airlift of 250 AAA guns and recoilless rifles, and agreed to replace the Pakistani losses before the end of 1966. For their part, the Soviets shipped in more materiel for the Indians.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM T01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-608 DOD 5010.10

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

(U) (S) (NF) From September 1965 until the end of 1966, the Chinese delivered at least 70 MIG-19's, 175-250 tanks, and virtually everything needed to outfit new Pakistan divisions. The U. S. embargo was lifted in 1967, but only for spares; "lethal" items, to include tanks, aircraft, and other standard weapons, were kept on the prohibited list. The Chinese agreed to continued arms supply in 1967, including some IL-28's, and 300 T-59 medium tanks, if surplus to Chinese defense needs. China also agreed to establish two ordnance works in East Pakistan and to enlarge another in West Pakistan.

(U) (S) (NF) The Soviets sought to even out their South Asian policy in June 1967 through the sale to Pakistan of helicopters and 2,000 trucks. A further Soviet attempt to reduce Sino-Pakistani cooperation came in 1968 with an agreement to supply 200 tanks, 130mm guns, and possibly MIG-21's to Pakistan. The Soviets eventually delivered only 60 tanks when it became clear that the Pakistanis would not change their policies. The Indians continued to forge ahead, contracting for some 480 T-54 and T-55 tanks from the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

(U) (S) (NF) Another attempt to win back the Pakistanis was made by the US in 1970. A one-time cash sale offer of some fighter aircraft, APC's, and other items was announced. The Pakistanis ordered 300 APC's but were unable to receive them until yet another embargo had passed in 1973. The US bid did not dissuade the Pakistanis from another PRC arms agreement in November 1970.

(U) (S) (NF) The unavailability of the US as an arms supplier was again demonstrated in July 1971, when military sales to Pakistan were embargoed because of the repressions in East Pakistan. The East Pakistan problems led to the December 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. As in 1965, this conflict was brief, but it was even more costly for the Pakistanis than the earlier war. Once more, the Chinese launched a massive resupply effort to replace Pakistani battle losses. By February 1972, the Chinese had delivered 30 MIG-19's and agreed to supply 100-140 T-59 medium tanks and all equipment necessary for two divisions. In March 1973, the US lifted the embargo on limited cash sales of certain arms, including the long-awaited 300 APC's. In the same year, the Chinese delivered 150 tanks, 270 artillery pieces, and six minor naval combatants.

(U) (S) (NF) The Heavy Mechanical Complex at Taxila, representing a Chinese commitment of up to \$250 million in grant aid, will introduce a new level of Chinese military assistance if it becomes fully operational. Plans call for a T-59 medium tank repair shop, a T-59 assembly plant, heavy machinery works and other industrial facilities within the complex.

(U) (S) (NF) It had been expected that the T-59 assembly plant would begin full production once the associated Taxila Heavy Forge and Foundry was completed in 1975. The pace of the current international arms race has caught up with the tank program, however, and there is some doubt that T-59's will ever be produced at Taxila. The Pakistanis decided that the T-59 model would be obsolete before production could even begin and would be unmarketable in the Arab world; accordingly, they slowed work on the factory complex. They had learned that the PRC was developing a new tank, believed to be a version of the T-59 with an automatic transmission (patterned after US-made transmissions supplied from Pakistani M-47's and M-48's), a modified engine, and a larger gun, and suggested that the Taxila plant produce the new tank.

RE GRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.10

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

On the basis of discussions with a high-ranking Chinese military delegation which visited Pakistan in January 1974, the Pakistanis believed the Chinese would give them access to the new tank prototype. In May 1974, however, the Chinese turned cool and said that they could give the Pakistanis access to the new tank plans for only three weeks, sometime after October 1974. In any event, the Chinese said that the T-59 was adequate for Pakistan's defensive needs and that China could not afford to pay for the necessary modifications of the planned T-59 factory. The Pakistanis suspect that the Chinese simply are waiting until financing is available from Arab sources. Ambitious planning by the Pakistanis foresees Saudi Arabian funding of the project, which would pay for itself through sales to Arab countries. The first tanks would appear three years after final negotiations for the design with the Chinese. In the first year, 350 tanks would be produced, of which 200 would go to the Pakistan Army and 150 to Arab customers. In the second year, 300 of 500 tanks would be exported. In the third year, the full capacity production of 600 tanks would be achieved, with 400 exported to the Middle East. The projected price for Arab customers is \$140,000 each.

(U)(S/AFB) The tank episode illustrates the inability of the PRC to meet demands for increasingly sophisticated military hardware, particularly in light of the October War. The T-59 was a good addition to Pakistan's aging inventory of American armor and covered a serious gap in Pakistani defensive capabilities; however, it cannot compete in the arms market of the later 1970's. The Chinese may be able to derive a measure of prestige and influence if their new tank is produced by Pakistan and gains customers in the Arab world.

(U)(S/AFB) It is surprising that, considering the apparently intensive Chinese activity in Pakistan, very few Chinese military advisors have appeared, as few as 25 at any one time in recent years. Similarly, few Pakistanis have gone to the PRC for training — as few as 190 individuals from 1965 to 1973. These figures confirm the high level of technical competence present in the Pakistan Armed Forces prior to the PRC's arrival and the emphasis on the importance of hardware.

(U)(S/AFB) To give further perspective to the scale of Chinese military aid to Pakistan, the \$309 million in total estimated PRC arms deliveries to Pakistan through 1973 should be compared to Pakistan's defense budget for just one year (FY 1974) of \$456 million and to the Soviet delivery of \$296 million in arms aid to Iraq in 1973 alone. In the time frame 1956 - June 1973, some 70 percent of the PRC's military assistance to the LDC's had gone to Pakistan; however, the Chinese aid accounted for only about 40 percent of Pakistan's total military imports during that period — France supplies 22 percent of Pakistan's military acquisitions. Although military aid to Pakistan is the most significant item in Peking's arms assistance program, Chinese aid is substantial but not overwhelming in Pakistani eyes.

(U)(S/AFB) In reviewing the criticality of the military items imported, the Chinese materiel assumes more prominence than the dollar amounts indicate, for much of it consisted of essential combat equipment, including T-59 tanks and MIG-19 fighters. Again, however, a balanced assessment should be maintained by noting that the arms bought from France in large part consisted of advanced missiles, electronics, submarines, combat aircraft, and other weapons systems not available from the PRC and embargoed by the US and UK. About one-third of Pakistan's supersonic fighters are French-made (the other two-thirds are Chinese).

RE GRATED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM 101 PO  
AUTH Para 1-600 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

(U) (S/NFD) Despite the increasing tendency of the Pakistanis to shop elsewhere for the newer generations of weaponry, both parties should have grounds for believing the decade of military association has been mutually beneficial. The Pakistanis were able to avail themselves of a (free (or cheap), rapid resupply of major military items following two costly wars. They accomplished the original goal of diversifying their sources of supply and maintaining a credible defense during a period of Indian military expansion. There were some negative results, such as the alarm of the Free World over PRC assistance, but these did not seriously affect events. The Chinese also can feel that, with a relatively moderate expenditure, they were able to keep India preoccupied with Pakistan instead of the Chinese border, to counter Soviet encroachments in South Asia, and to prevent a possible Soviet penetration of Pakistan.

#### Guerillas, Open and Covert

(U) (S/NFD) One category of military assistance recipients appears not to have been significantly reduced--national liberation and other guerrilla movements. In providing aid to the national liberation movements in Africa, the PRC military advisors operate openly in cooperative countries, training guerrillas and occasionally planning specific operations into neighboring colonies or target countries. This unconcealed assistance has become so common and accepted as to elicit only token protests from the aggrieved regimes. Support to guerrilla movements which are directed against independent nations, many of which enjoy ostensibly friendly relations with the PRC, meets much more varied reaction.

(U) (S/NFD) Since prior to the Portuguese coup of April 1974, the PRC has appeared to be reallocating arms assistance, reducing aid to many nations, but steadily increasing support of the black African liberation movements, particularly those targeted against the Portuguese colonial holdings. During a December 1973 Peking visit by Holden Roberto, leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the Chinese agreed to train 500 guerrillas in Zaire as instructors and to provide arms and material for up to 15,000 members of an Angolan liberation army. The PRC was to provide two-thirds of the equipment and Zaire one-third. At the beginning of June 1974, the first of 112 Chinese military advisors arrived in Zaire to begin training the Angolans. Similar but smaller Angolan guerrilla support arrangements have been made in Zambia, which also acts as a base area for insurgents operating against Rhodesia. The Chinese have offered ZANU, a Zambian-based Rhodesian liberation movement, leadership training and enough equipment for 2,000 guerrillas; they went so far as to advise ZANU to make major strikes into Rhodesia in order to draw world attention.

(U) (S/NFD) In the wake of the Lisbon changeover and the suddenly-heightened likelihood of an African takeover in Angola and Mozambique in the near future, the PRC appears to be covering all bets. In July 1974, a donation of money was made to UNITA, the smallest of three contending liberation movements in Angola.

(U) (S/NFD) The Soviets, too, have provided training and arms for African guerrillas, but, for various reasons, have been unable to achieve more prestige than the Chinese.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PC  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



~~SECRET~~

(U) (S) (C) One of the aspects of Chinese foreign policy which often seems perplexing concerns the policy of promoting good relations with a foreign government, yet at the same time encouraging and supplying weapons to internal dissidents. Various explanations have been attempted for this apparent contradiction which is typified by such anomalies as the Chinese-supported insurgency in northeast Burma.

(U) (S) (C) The Chinese themselves have not quibbled over the matter--the Director of the International Liaison Department, Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party told a foreign Communist visitor that China would continue this two-level policy of maintaining good relations with the legal government in selected countries, such as Burma, Thailand, and Chile, the better to support the local rebels. This policy is not without danger, for it was precisely this type of meddling which seriously damaged PRC diplomacy, and foreign Communist movements as well, in the mid-1960's in Africa and Indonesia. In the latter state, a large Communist Party was ~~eliminated~~ following an abortive coup led by Chinese-armed leftists.

(U) (S) (C) A significant covert effort involves the restive ethnic groups within India's eastern frontiers. The Chinese for several years have furnished military equipment and training to separatist tribes, primarily the Nagas and Mizos. The assistance has been too small to make a serious impact on Indian internal security, but it served to keep the Indians off balance so long as East Pakistan acted as a sanctuary and supply point. There had been reports as early as 1961 that the PRC was providing military aid to Naga rebels. By 1965, a modest program was under way, often aided by the Pakistanis. Nagas and Mizos traveled to Yunnan for guerrilla training, passing through Burma; as many as 4,000 Nagas may have made the journey. Others apparently received training in East Pakistan from Chinese instructors. A small number of Chinese military cadres probably operated for short periods in the affected areas of India, training insurgents, studying the operational environment, and escorting arms shipments. At first, the rebels were given US and other weapons captured in Korea or remaining from World War II stocks. Later, the Chinese furnished modern weapons from their own inventory.

(U) (S) (C) The tribal dissidents have become less active, now that the East Pakistan sanctuary has been eliminated. The support, however little it was, served to distract the Indians and drain away security forces from both the Chinese border and East Pakistan.

(U) (S) (C) In other covert arms programs, the Chinese gave a small amount of aid, primarily guerrilla training in China, to the Naxalites, an ultramilitant Indian Communist faction which specialized in terrorism. Chinese arms found with captured Naxalites, however, probably were supplied by private smugglers, not the PRC. Widespread unfavorable reaction to the Naxalite violence, plus altered PRC priorities, led the Chinese to advise the Naxalites in 1972 to be self-reliant and to reduce the level of violence. Other efforts at unsettling the Indians include a promise to provide "all the resources needed" to Sikkimese national liberationists, given by PRC diplomats in Nepal. It was stipulated, however, that the Sikkimese first must develop a solid base of political support.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 10 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM I 01 PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

Factors in Assessing Impact of Chinese Military Aid

(U) It is fairly simple to assess the dollar value of the PRC's military assistance to any particular nation, assuming that we have observed the major deliveries. Comparisons with other arms suppliers, e.g., the Soviet Union, can also be made. Study of the monetary value of arms deliveries and associated aid is best applied, however, to the analysis of the donor nation's allocation of resources, defense budget, etc. To reveal trends and patterns, it is far more informative to utilize data on the materiel itself: type of equipment and totals by category. Similarly, figures regarding in-country military technicians and trainees abroad are valuable. The statistical approach, by dollars or item/people totals, is in fact a standard method for analyzing Communist military assistance programs; however, the completed analysis can be misleading if results basically tell us only that one set of figures is more or less than another set.

(U) There are other considerations that should enter into any analysis of military assistance. A shipment of small arms to an unstable, newly-independent nation would clearly concern observers more than a like shipment to a stabilized regime. Expensive equipment could have less impact than cheaper materiel, depending on the situation, the recipient, the supplier, relations between the two parties and their respective friends and foes, and so on. Similarly, a small number of sophisticated weapons systems could greatly outweigh the effective impact of a much costlier agreement involving common issue equipment. The actual cost of arms assistance to the supplier in economic and/or strategic terms also is a factor in assessing programs.

(U) With particular relevance to the PRC, the very fact of an initial or subsequent arms agreement may attract more attention than the dollar or strategic value would warrant. Not only have the Chinese developed a reputation for subversion of host governments, but for many years they also profited from the fear that the slightest indication of Chinese involvement presaged a massive flow of Chinese "volunteers."

(U) (S) One of the most important elements in assessing the impact of China's military aid programs is the question of technology--can the PRC's weapons and expertise reasonably compete with the increasingly sophisticated weapons of other arms suppliers? If not, can the Chinese find sufficient other clients to maintain a military assistance program at current levels? The answer to both questions apparently is no. China cannot match the sophistication of the export items of such producers as the US, the USSR, France, the UK, West Germany, Eastern Europe, etc. One of the reactions to the Middle East October War has been a dramatic rise in the level of arms sophistication necessary to satisfy LDC customers seeking weapons systems comparable to the GABRIELS, SA-6's, CRAILS, and other publicized standouts of the conflict. It would seem that, other than in the categories of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, China has largely relied upon the technology acquired from the Soviets prior to the 1960 split. The "technological race" places extreme pressures on China's ability to compete. If this trend continues, the PRC may be forced to limit its assistance to filling gaps left behind by more technologically advanced donors. The PRC will have lost initiative in international military assistance competition. In those few areas where the PRC made a major effort at developing significant military influence, principally Pakistan and Tanzania, the erstwhile customers are looking elsewhere for newer equipment and are ready to pay market prices, if necessary.

RE GRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON SEP 16 1997  
PRC DR USAINSCOM F01/P  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

**SECRET**

(U) (FOUO) China's experience in the field of foreign military assistance is not as well documented as that of the Soviet Union, but it has been relatively comprehensive, particularly in Pakistan and Sub-Saharan Africa. The seeming quiet efficiency with which the Chinese pursued their programs suggested that they had developed a special knack for this difficult and often treacherous trade, a good mixture of American-style folkiness and professional competence. Careful review of the Chinese programs reveals some flaws in this myth of easy success. On occasion, they have proven to be as aloof and unpleasant as the Russians and to irritate local populations with their drab Maoist ethic. Although difficult to measure, the favorable or unfavorable images projected by the Chinese among foreign populations have great relevance to the success or failure of a mission. The Chinese are often compared with Soviet advisors, usually to the detriment of the latter. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Soviet military advisors were accused of showing "arrogance and condescension" toward the PDY personnel they advised; on the other hand, members of the Chinese mission were praised as "honest and hard-working." It was the same story in North Yemen. Zambian President Kaunda was impressed with the deportment and training of Chinese personnel providing military training in his country; a sizable expansion of the Chinese military mission followed. The Chinese enjoyed high prestige among Omani rebels because they allegedly provided instruction "in the field;" the Soviets merely sought to influence the rebels through contacts in Aden. The Chinese have their bad days, too. In the latter part of 1973, Chinese instructors in Congo joined, and perhaps incited 42 Congolese who had returned from a six-month naval training course in China, in agitation against apparent plans for training by Soviets. Matters worsened in October, and 12 Chinese military advisors abruptly departed Brazzaville 30 October aboard a Chinese plane. The Chinese Ambassador belatedly assured President Ngousbi that the advisors would be replaced before Congolese pilots then training in China returned. In promising that replacement advisors would be "expert and fact-minded," the Ambassador seemed to be admitting that the departed advisors had left under a cloud. The situation apparently resulted from some six months of friction between the Chinese and Congolese military personnel. The Congolese disliked the Chinese for alleged arrogance, cliquishness, and rigidity. At least twice, advisors had been physically attacked. French-trained officers quarrelled over tactics and procedures, and MCO's trained by the Cubans in the early 1960's reportedly sought to undermine the Chinese from ideological grounds. Africans have often expressed, if not dislike, then a certain disdain for the puritanical attitude of the Chinese, whose work ethic bored and irritated peoples with freer life styles.

#### Conclusions

(U) (FOUO) The Chinese military assistance program for the less developed nations of the world has lost its earlier momentum and entered a phase of reduction and rationalization. The leaders of the PRC have explained to arms-seekers that China must husband its defense production to meet the threat of Soviet military attack. It is also clear in many instances that China's painfully developed but increasingly outdated military technology is losing its allure for some former arms clients, who desire and can easily buy better elsewhere. Any advances in military equipment made by China will necessarily be channeled first to domestic requirements--the PRC seems unable to afford an arms industry which can supply foreign clients with sophisticated weapons and will provide a reasonably strong defensive arsenal.

**SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

~~SECRET~~

(U) (S) (P) The PRC likely will continue to maintain previous arms delivery commitments and will provide spares and maintenance for already-delivered equipment. New, genuinely sizable arms agreements are improbable, although materiel and training arrangements with African liberation movements may involve large amounts of small arms and in-country training of guerrilla main-force units, with a corresponding strengthening of cooperative base countries, such as Zaire.

(U) (S) (P) The novelty of Chinese military aid programs far from China and their prevalence throughout the lesser developed countries have perhaps tended to obscure the essential tokenism of many of them. Intelligence reference publications, for example, consume columns and columns detailing arms programs in an impressive number of small countries. These publications sometimes present statistical data spanning decades in lieu of analysis; the inevitable depreciation of military hardware is not considered.

(U) (S) (P) Because the Chinese have spread their arms assistance thinly, but over a surprisingly broad area of the Third World, it has appeared that their program was greater than it was.

(U) (S) (P) Although heavy propaganda exploitation of their work in the LDC's led to a belief that the Chinese military assistance programs were important features of the competition with the Soviets for leadership of the LDC's, subtle but visible changes in Chinese priorities over the past two years suggest that military assistance is no longer a major factor to the PRC in the rivalry. This trend is likely to continue as long as the PRC focuses greater attention on domestic political affairs and the threat of Soviet military action against the PRC.

15  
DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
SEP 1 1997  
PRC CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

19

# UNCLASSIFIED

## DISTRIBUTION:

### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)	(1)	1
Assistant Secretary of Defense (I)	(2)	2
ASD, Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation	(1)	1
Director, Defense Research and Engineering	(1)	1
Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	(1)	1
Director, National Security Agency	(30)	30
DDO	(1)	
D	(2)	
D2	(1)	
D21	(3)	
D211	(2)	
D212	(1)	
D213	(1)	
D25	(1)	
D251	(1)	
D3	(1)	
D33	(2)	
D	(1)	
D5	(1)	
D6	(1)	
D7	(1)	
D75	(2)	
D9	(1)	
D92	(1)	
D94	(6)	
D94	(6)	
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	(1)	39
DI	(2)	
DI-4	(1)	
DI-4 (Pentagon)	(1)	
DI-4B1	(1)	
DI-4B2	(1)	
DI-5	(3)	
DI-5	(1)	
Library (DD-4A)	(2)	
LOISX (FORSEC LPO)	(20)	
Attache Affairs (for appropriate DAO's)	(1)	
UNESCO, BONG KONG	(1)	1
National War College		2
Industrial College of the Armed Forces		2
Armed Forces Staff College		2
Defense Documentation Center		

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence	(1)	5
DAMI-DD	(1)	
DAMI-DD	(1)	
DAMI-FIE	(4)	
DAMI-FII	(1)	
DAMI-DD		

## UNCLASSIFIED

Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations	5
The Army Library (ASDIMS)	1
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command	2
U.S. Army Air Defense School	1
U.S. Army Armor School	1
U.S. Army Aviation School	1
U.S. Army Engineer School	1
U.S. Army Field Artillery School	3
U.S. Army Ordnance School	1
U.S. Army Infantry School	1
U.S. Army Signal School	1
U.S. Army Intelligence School	2
U.S. Army War College (Library)	2
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College	2
U.S. Army Security Agency	1
U.S. Army Security Agency, Europe	1
U.S. Army Security Agency, Pacific	1
U.S. Army Engineer Strategic Studies Group	2
U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency	1
U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center	2
U.S. Army Institute of Strategic and Stability Operations	1
U.S. Army Imagery Interpretation Center	2
U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army	5
U.S. Army, Pacific	2
Eighth U.S. Army	1
USMAAG, Taiwan	1
500th MI Group	2
66th MI Group	2
Cdr, USAINTA	2
Cdr, USASPD	20
U.S. Army Forces Command	7
G-2	(2)
FORSEC	(5)

### UNIFIED COMMANDS

Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command	2
Commander in Chief, Pacific	1
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command	2
Commander, European Command Defense Analysis Center	1
USARPAC, SHAPE	2
USDOCO, COMLANDGOUTHEAST	1
USDOCO, AFCEAST	1
USDOCO, AFNORTH	1
USDOCO, AFSOUTH	1
Intelligence Center, Pacific	1
U.S. Forces, Japan	1

### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence	1
AFIB/IN1, Ft. Meade, MD	1
Commander in Chief, US Air Forces, Europe	1
Commander, U.S. Air Force Systems Command	1
Commander, U.S. Air Force Foreign Technology Division	1
Air University Library	2

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Intelligence Command  
Naval Field Operational Intelligence Office  
Naval Intelligence Support Center  
Naval War College

1  
1  
1  
2

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Director, Central Intelligence Agency

(1)  
(4)  
(6)

11

U.S. Department of State  
EA/PRCM  
ISA/NSA  
UNLO, PEKING  
STATE DEPARTMENT LIBRARY

(1)  
(3)  
(1)  
(3)

212

Total copies

EO 1.552 (b) (3)  
PER CIA

UNCLASSIFIED